





i 

» 

i 

1 • , I 

• 1 


« 


( 


f 


j 



t 






« 

*1 

I 

• u 

j 


\ 




‘ 1 ' 


« 

I 


, •v' 


1 


\ 


\ } 

4 

.Ml 

• ,1 

X 


I 



4 


t 

\ I 


■M 




e* 

•J 


i 

•l • 


i 













Introduction 


World War II was the largest and most violent armed conflict in 
the history of mankind. However, the half century that now sepa- 
rates us from that conflict has exacted its toll on our collective 
knowledge. While World War II continues to absorb the interest of 
military scholars and historians, as well as its veterans, a generation 
of Americans has grown to maturity largely unaware of the political, 
social, and military implications of a war that, more than any other, 
united us as a people with a common purpose. 

Highly relevant today. World War II has much to teach us, not 
only about the profession of arms, but also about military pre- 
paredness, global strategy, and combined operations in the coalition 
war against fascism. During the next several years, the U.S. Army 
will participate in the nation’s 50th anniversary commemoration of 
World War II. The commemoration will include the publication of 
various materials to help educate Americans about that war. The 
works produced will provide great opportunities to learn about and 
renew pride in an Army that fought so magnificently in what has 
been called “the mighty endeavor.” 

World War II was waged on land, on sea, and in the air over sev- 
eral diverse theaters of operation for approximately six years. The 
following essay is one of a series of campaign studies highlighting 
those struggles that, with their accompanying suggestions for further 
reading, are designed to introduce you to one of the Army’s signifi- 
cant military feats from that war. 

This brochure was prepared in the U.S. Army Center of Military 
History by Charles R. Anderson. I hope this absorbing account of 
that period will enhance your appreciation of American achieve- 
ments during World War II. 


T)743 
tl 55 

X 





M. P. W. Stone 
Secretary of the Army 


^ 3'^‘/4 73 ^ 


Papua 

23 July 1942-23 January 1943 


bLoao- 

I50> 


On 7 December 1941, Japan turned its war on the Asian main- 
land eastward into the Pacific. Simultaneous attacks on Pearl Harbor, 
the Philippines, the Malayan peninsula, and other places surprised 
Allied governments and exposed serious weaknesses in Allied dis- 
positions in the Pacific. At the outbreak of war in Europe in Septem- 
ber 1939, Australia had sent most of its ground units to the British 
Commonwealth Forces in the Middle East. During the next two 
years the U.S. Pacific Fleet sent one-quarter of its ships to the At- 
lantic, and the U.S. Army continued mobilizing, although it would 
not be ready for an offensive mission until late 1942. Hastily gather- 
ing scarce units, the Allies tried to halt the Japanese at the Malay 
Barrier, the mountainous chain of islands stretching from Malaya 
through the Netherlands East Indies to New Guinea. But the pace 
and extent of Japanese conquests soon overran these preparations. 
The fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942 and the bombing of the 
Australian city of Darwin four days later shattered the Malay Bar- 
rier. Australia and New Zealand lay virtually undefended. 

Strategic Setting 

The arrival in Australia on 17 March of General Douglas 
Mac Arthur, ordered from the Philippines by President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, signaled the start of a new phase in the defense of the Pa- 
cific. Instead of supplying and supporting its Allies, the United States 
would commit its own troops to the effort to halt the Japanese. A 
major area command. Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), was created 
in April with General MacArthur commanding. An international 
command, SWPA had separate land, air, and naval forces, with com- 
manders drawn from the two major contributing nations: Australian 
General Sir Thomas A. Blarney for Allied Land Forces, American 
Lt. Gen. George H. Brett for Allied Air Forces, and American Vice 
Adm. Herbert F. Leary for Allied Naval Forces. Allied Land Forces 
would consist of two Australian and two American divisions. Re- 
called from the Middle East, the 7th Australian Infantry Division ar- 
rived home at the end of March; the 6th Australian Infantry Division, 
the next month. Most of the U.S. 41st Infantry Division arrived in 


Australia in early April. The U.S. 32d Infantry Division, originally 
slated for Northern Ireland, received new orders to join SWPA in 
mid-May with the rest of the 41st Division. Allied Air Forces would 
eventually consist of eight aircraft groups. Allied Naval Forces began 
with twenty-one surface warships and thirty-one submarines and 
could expect augmentation by American carrier task forces. Resup- 
ply of the Southwest Pacific Area would come from Hawaii through 
a line of island bases secured in February: Palmyra, Christmas Island, 
Canton Island, Bora Bora, Samoa, and the Fiji Islands. 

Working with the Australian Chiefs of Staff, General MacArthur 
prepared a joint estimate of the situation. The Allies agreed that the 
Japanese advance would continue and that it would soon threaten 
the Australian supply line as well as the island nation itself. As Gen- 
eral MacArthur viewed the situation, the best way to defend Aus- 
tralia was to meet the Japanese on New Guinea, and the way into 
New Guinea lay through Port Moresby, a harbor on the southeast 
Papuan coast lightly garrisoned by Australians. Accordingly, in early 
April MacArthur directed the reinforcement of Port Moresby. 

While the Allies rushed to strengthen Port Moresby, the Japa- 
nese acted on their own strategic assessment. They also considered 
Port Moresby the key to Australia. But before approaching the port 
city, the Japanese moved to finish a naval mission begun earlier. 
The Imperial Japanese Navy saw its strike against Pearl Harbor as 
only half of a two-part strategy. To secure exploitation of Burma, 
Malaya, and the Indies, the Japanese had to neutralize the British 
Eastern Fleet. For that purpose, a large Japanese naval task force 
left the southwest Pacific for the Indian Ocean in April. The Japa- 
nese succeeded in disabling the British Eastern Fleet, but in doing so 
they also gave SWPA an extra month to reinforce Port Moresby. 

By 4 May, when a Japanese landing force embarked at Rabaul 
for Port Moresby, Allied air and naval forces had grown to decisive 
strength. The result for the Japanese was a major setback. As enemy 
troopships and an escorting carrier task force approached the east- 
ern end of New Guinea, they were met by two American carrier 
task forces. In the ensuing Battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese 
Navy lost so many ships that the landing force had to return to 
Rabaul. Though they lost more ships than the Japanese, the Allies 
won a strategic victory in the Coral Sea: the enemy had to resched- 
ule its Port Moresby landing for July. 

The Japanese had barely counted their losses in the Coral Sea 
when they met a much more costly defeat. In an effort to take Mid- 
way Island and the Aleutians, the Imperial Japanese Navy put to- 


4 


gether a huge task force centered on four fast carriers. A unique 
message-interception effort code-named Magic enabled the Allies 
to learn of the enemy move toward Midway, and three American 
carriers were sent to intercept. In the sea-air battle that followed on 
4 June, the Japanese lost all four of their carriers and hundreds of 
aircraft and pilots. The stunning defeat at Midway was more than a 
temporary setback. The Japanese Navy never replaced its carrier 
losses, and as a result its land operations thereafter suffered from a 
chronic shortage of naval and air support. 

But two defeats in rapid succession did not end the threat to Aus- 
tralia. On 22 July a Japanese landing force under Maj. Gen. Tomitaro 
Horii slipped ashore at Basabua and made its way to Buna on the north- 
east coast of New Guinea. The landing itself came as a shock to SWPA 
headquarters, then considering the very same move. Even more disqui- 
eting was the discovery that the enemy had landed without air cover. 

Operations 

Anxious to take advantage of the victory of Midway, Allied staffs 
drew up an operations plan. Called the 2 July Directive, the plan laid 
down three tasks: 1. seizure and occupation of the Santa Cruz Is- 
lands, Tulagi, and adjacent areas; 2. seizure and occupation of the re- 
mainder of the Solomon Islands, Lae, Salamaua, and the northeast 
coast of New Guinea; and 3. seizure and occupation of Rabaul and 
adjacent positions in the New Guinea-New Ireland area. The U.S. 
Navy’s South Pacific Area commander assumed the first mission; 
General MacArthur took up the latter two tasks. To support the 
Navy in the first task and to execute its own two tasks, SWPA created 
new commands, moved units closer to target areas, and continued 
airfield construction and reinforcement, especially at Port Moresby 
and at Milne Bay on the eastern tip of New Guinea. The U.S. 32d 
and 41st Infantry Divisions began jungle training, organized in a new 
corps under the command of Maj. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger. 

Short of aircraft carriers after Midway, the Japanese decided to 
attack Port Moresby by an overland advance from Buna instead of 
around Milne Bay by sea. This plan dictated a push through some of 
the most forbidding terrain in the world. The Papuan peninsula of 
eastern New Guinea is dominated by the Owen Stanley Mountains, 
a saw-toothed jungle range reaching a height of 13,000 feet. High 
temperatures and humidity near the coasts contrast with biting cold 
above 5,000 feet. Rainfall is typically torrential and can amount to as 
much as 10 inches per day during the rainy season. Tangled growth 


5 



General Blarney tours the battle area with General Eichelberger (left). 
(DA photograph) 


requires a machete to cut through it. Knife-edged kunai grass up to 
7 feet high, reeking swamps full of leeches and malarial mosquitoes, 
and a slippery ground surface under dripping vegetation add to the 
formidable obstacle course. 

For the advance out of Buna the Japanese assembled a force of 
about 1,800 men augmented by 1,300 laborers from Rabaul and For- 
mosa and 52 horses. This force proposed to cross Papua through the 
village of Kokoda, some 50 miles from Buna and over 100 miles from 
Port Moresby. Next to the village lay a facility highly valued by both 
sides: an airfield. Quickly moving inland, the Japanese met their first 
opposition late in the afternoon of 22 July. During the next two weeks. 
General Horii’s troops defeated several Australian and Papuan units 
and took over the entire Kokoda-Buna Trail. When Horii received re- 
inforcements on 18 August, he headed a well-supplied force of 8,000 
Imperial Japanese Army troops and 3,450 naval troops. 

By mid-August the two adversaries were inadvertently helping 
each other by relying on poor intelligence assessments. Caught off- 
guard by U.S. Marine landings in the Solomons, General Horii had to 
spread his resources over two fronts, Guadalcanal and Buna. But the 


6 



Allies underestimated the Japanese determination to build up a large 
force at Buna and push overland to Port Moresby. Brig. Gen. Charles 
A. Willoughby, MacArthur’s intelligence chief, repeatedly discounted 
an enemy attack through the mountains because of the difficult ter- 
rain and climate. As a result, the Allies continued reinforcing small 
units on the trail, and the enemy continued overrunning them. 

With the Japanese well established at Buna and Kokoda, SWPA 
reorganized to counterattack on two fronts: along the Kokoda Trail 
and 200 miles east at Milne Bay. Three Australian brigades with 
American reinforcements strengthened the two fronts. At Milne 
Bay the Allies assembled a force of some 7,500 troops, including 
three companies of U.S. engineers and a battery of U.S. airborne an- 
tiaircraft artillery. Named Milne Force, this two-brigade concentra- 
tion took positions around two Allied airfields. On the night of 
25-26 August the Japanese landed 1,500 men six miles east of the 
airfields. Spearheaded by two light tanks, the Japanese mounted 
night assaults on the 26th and 27th, and reached Airstrip No. 3. 
Milne Force stiffened its line and then pushed the enemy into a 
general retreat. On 4 September the Japanese called in the Navy for 
evacuation. In this first Allied ground victory — and first significant 
American action in Papua — Milne Force killed 600 of the enemy, 
while losing 322 dead and 200 wounded. 

Along the Kokoda Trail the Allies found a different situation. In- 
stead of continuing their drive toward the certain capture of Port 
Moresby, the Japanese stopped at the village of loribaiwa, thirty 
miles short of their objective. Surprised at the sudden halt, the Al- 
lies soon learned that the Japanese agreed with their own strategic 
view: that success on New Guinea was directly related to success on 
Guadalcanal. The Japanese drive against the U.S. Marine beach- 
head in the Solomons had been repulsed, and on 18 September 
General Horii received orders to withdraw to Buna for a possible 
reinforcement of the Imperial Japanese Army forces on Guadal- 
canal. Once again the enemy had given the Allies time to regroup. 

General MacArthur took advantage of the victory at Milne Bay 
and the enemy withdrawal from the Kokoda Trail to draw up a com- 
prehensive plan to clear New Guinea of the enemy. SWPAs 1 Octo- 
ber plan called for a series of sweeps and envelopments along three 
axes of advance that would position Allied forces for an attack on 
Buna in mid-November. On the first axis, the 7th Australian Infantry 
Division would move up the main trail from Port Moresby, cross the 
Owen Stanley Range through Kokoda, and occupy Wairopi, only 
twenty-five miles from Buna. On the second axis, the American 2d 


7 



“Jungle Trail” by Franklin Boggs. 
Thick jungles of the Southwest Pa- 
cific Area made resupply an arduous 
process. (Army Art Collection) 


Battalion of the 126th Infantry, setting out from Port Moresby, would 
turn inland at Kapa Kapa and move through the mountains to Jaure 
on a track parallel to, but thirty miles southeast of, the Australians. 
On the third axis, the 18th Australian Infantry Brigade, fresh from 
victory at Milne Bay, would sweep the north coast of the island and 
meet the U.S. 128th Infantry, airlifted from Port Moresby, at 
Wanigela. The two units would then cross Cape Nelson and stage at 
Embogo for the assault on enemy lines less than ten miles away. 

The 1 October plan was marked by the innovation which would 
characterize MacArthur’s leadership throughout the Pacific War: 
resupply by air. Once units entered the jungled mountains, resupply 
became a major problem. The Australian practice of relying on the 
strong backs of New Guineans did not solve the problem, since the 
bearers usually deserted when they suspected enemy presence. The 
Allies settled on the airdrop. Expanding its range as fast as new air- 
fields could be constructed, the Fifth Air Force proved invaluable in 
overcoming the obstacles of sea distance and rugged terrain. Crates 
of food and supplies were pushed out the hatches of low-flying 
C-47s over breaks in the jungle ceiling. Though not perfect — hun- 
gry, diseased troops sometimes saw crates of food, medicine, and 
ammunition fall down mountainsides just out of reach — the air- 
drops continued and improved as aircrews gained experience. 


8 



An innovation in resupply by sea also helped. Despite Japanese 
command of the seas in the Solomons-New Guinea area — the U.S. 
Navy had withdrawn from the area in late October after losing an air- 
craft carrier and seeing another badly damaged— the Allies were 
asked to take advantage of the shallow coastal waters of New Guinea. 
In their advance from Milne Bay the Allies moved troops and sup- 
plies by fishing boats, luggers, rowboats, and even outrigger canoes. 

The 7th Australian Infantry Division initiated the 1 October 
plan by attacking toward Kokoda. At three places Japanese rear- 
guard units set up blocking positions along the trail, and at all three 
the Australians, supported by Fifth Air Force bombing and strafing 
runs, enveloped and overran the enemy. On 2 November Kokoda 
and its airfield were back in Allied hands, and on the 13th the 7th 
moved fifteen miles ahead to Wairopi, only twenty-seven miles from 
the Buna perimeter. Japanese troops scattered northward toward 
Sanananda, where they set up a coastal strongpoint the Allies would 
have to attack later. But they were off the Kokoda Trail. 

The airlift of units to and along the northeast coastal axis went 
smoothly. In the first week of October an Australian battalion flew to 
Wanigela on the east side of Cape Nelson, and two weeks later the 
128th Infantry flew from Port Moresby to Wanigela. Since these units 
stood vulnerable to attack from enemy-held islands to the north, SWPA 
direct^ an assault on Goodenough Island, closest to New Guinea, by 
another Australian battalion from Milne Bay. After a firefight with a 
small enemy force preparing to leave, the battalion secured the island. 

The Allied ground advances across Cape Nelson and up the Kapa 
Kapa-Jaure axis proved severe trials of endurance. Moving across the 
base of Cape Nelson, the 3d Battalion of the 128th Infantry soon found 
itself floundering through the knee-deep mud of a malarial swamp. 
The unit abandoned its planned route and made directly for the coast. 
When the battalion reached its objective of Pongani by sea on 28 Oc- 
tober, many of its men were suffering from malaria and other fevers. 

In a twelve-day march from Kapa Kapa to Jaure the men of the 
2d Battalion of the 126th Infantry struggled against the worst con- 
ditions New Guinea could offer. The heat, the sharp kunai grass, the 
leeches and fever-bearing insects, and the slippery trail broke down 
discipline, and the troops discarded large amounts of equipment to 
lighten their loads. The ration — Australian bully beef, rice, and 
tea — made some sick, and diarrhea and dysentery claimed many. 
Five days of steady rain from 15 October made heating food and 
boiling water impossible and forced the men to wade through neck- 
deep water when crossing streams. At higher elevations the battal- 


9 



ion found razor-backed ridges so steep that the men had to cling to 
vines to maintain progress. One group stumbled and slid 2,000 feet 
downhill in forty minutes; it took eight hours to recover the dis- 
tance. The terrain even forced a change of leaders. The battalion 
commander suffered a heart attack on the trail and was evacuated to 
Port Moresby. On 25 October the lead company reached Jaure, its 
troops starving and sickly, their clothing in tatters, and their moti- 
vation to meet the Japanese in dire need of restoration. 

On hearing of the condition of the 2d Battalion after its crossing 
of the Owen Stanleys, the 32d Division commander, Maj. Gen. 
Edwin E Harding, was determined not to allow any of his other 
battalions to become so debilitated by the terrain of New Guinea. 
He requested that the rest of his troops be airlifted to the north 


10 


slope of the mountains; Blarney and MacArthur quickly approved. 
In an intelligence gift to the Allies, a missionary had come forward 
with news of an airfield near Fasari, a village about forty-two miles 
south of Pongani. Beginning 8 November the 126th Infantry flew to 
Fasari and Pongani, and then moved inland to Bofu, fourteen miles 
from the Buna perimeter. At the same time, the 128th Infantry 
moved up the coast from Pongani to Embogo, only seven miles 
from the enemy. Meanwhile on the Kokoda Trail, the 7th Australian 
Infantry Division pushed the enemy down the mountains toward the 
coast. The Allies were trapping the Japanese against the sea. 

Retreating enemy forces set up a beachhead defense stretching 
some sixteen miles along the coast and seven miles inland. The Jap- 
anese held several important locations within their perimeter: Gona 
Village, the west anchor of the enemy beachhead; Sanananda Point 
in the center; Duropa Plantation, the eastern anchor of the beach- 
head; Buna Village; Buna Mission, the prewar Australian adminis- 
trative center; and two airfields. Also inside the perimeter lay more 
swamps and streams than appeared on Allied maps and more enemy 
troops than SWPA estimated. In a major intelligence blunder. Allied 
staffs told frontline commanders that they faced no more than 1,500 
to 2,000 enemy and could expect the Japanese to surrender about 1 
December. In fact, some 6,500 enemy held the beachhead. 

SWPA planned a straight-ahead assault on Buna-Sanananda 
across a front of some twenty miles. The Girua River divided the 
area of operations into two roughly equal parts, with Maj. Gen. 
George A. Vasey’s 7th Australian Infantry Division on the left, or 
west, and Harding’s U.S. 32d Division on the right. Over General 
Harding’s objection, the U.S. 126th Infantry reinforced the Australian 
7th. Since the 32d Division had only two regiments instead of three 
when the assault began, the transfer of the 126th meant a 50 percent 
loss of fighting capacity. Harding could send only one regiment, the 
U.S. 128th, against Buna, and he would have no division reserve. 

The attack began the morning of 16 November on both sides of 
the Girua. On the left, the 7th Australian Infantry Division met no 
enemy opposition the first two days but found other problems nearly 
as serious. The Australians soon outran their supply line and had to 
go on short rations; heat exhaustion and the myriad fevers of New 
Guinea steadily reduced troop strength. When the first shots were ex- 
changed on the 18th, the troops found that every approach avoiding 
the swamps and streams brought them into enemy machine-gun-fire 
lanes. Despite this formidable defense, and without artillery support, 
the Australians pushed ahead. In three days of fighting they lost 204 


11 



dead and wounded, and they were still in no position to take Gona. 
Two days later, after brief air and artillery preparations, troops of the 
7th reached the innermost defenses of Gona but were quickly pushed 
back. On the division’s right a separate thrust at Sanananda fell short, 
though troops managed to set a roadblock behind the enemy. 


12 



In the American sector even more 
trouble developed. Hoping to use the 
coastal waters on its right to relieve prob- 
lems of supply and troop exhaustion, the 
32d Division loaded its ammunition, ra- 
tions, radios, and heavy weapons on lug- 
gers. After questionable planning, the 
heavily laden boats set out with no air 
cover. Japanese Zeroes soon spotted the 
boats and in strafing attacks sank all but 
one. Now the 128th had to push on with- 
out prospect of resupply, and on the 19th 
took its first fire from nearly invisible de- 
fensive positions. Two days later Fifth Air 
Force planes twice bombed the 128th In- 
fantry troops, killing ten and wounding 
fourteen. Despite these setbacks, the 32d 
Division mounted several local and three 
major attacks against Japanese positions. 
The return of the 2d Battalion of the 126th 
Infantry to American control on 23 No- 
vember raised hopes of success, but the 
32d Division failed to dislodge the enemy. 

The November attacks revealed with 
painful clarity a Japanese strength: 
tenacity in defense. This strength re- 
flected both a selfless fanaticism in sup- 
port of imperial expansion and a mas- 
tery of field engineering. The Japanese 
simply made better use of the local ter- 
rain. Aware of the high water table of 
New Guinea coastal areas, the Ameri- 
cans relied on the fact that the enemy 
could not construct below-ground de- 
fenses. The Japanese proved the fallacy 
of Allied thinking by cutting trees and 
raising berms above ground, then con- 
cealing strongpoints with kunai grass and tying them together with 
interlocking fields of fire. As a result, approaching troops could not 
see the enemy bunkers until they were only about twenty feet away, 
by which time the Japanese had opened fire. Without armor or 
heavy artillery and air support, infantrymen could only crawl up to 


13 



American and Australian casualties, with Papuan litter bearers. (DA 
photograph) 


each bunker and jam hand grenades into firing slits, a process both 
slow and costly in casualties. 

The Southwest Pacific Area was deeply concerned at the failure 
of the 32d Division’s November attacks. Two weeks of offensive op- 
erations had produced 492 American casualties, and the enemy still 
held its positions. Staff officers wondered how much longer the un- 
derfed and diseased troops could keep fighting the Japanese and the 
climate of New Guinea. The international alliance that SWPA rep- 
resented also showed strain, as Australians and Americans traded 
disparaging comments on their respective fighting abilities. 

Changes were called for, and General MacArthur set them in 
motion. Summoning General Eichelberger, he bluntly told the corps 
commander, “Take Buna or don’t come back alive!” Eichelberger 
immediately went forward to see conditions for himself. The enemy 
in front of the 32d Division now held a pocket stretching some four 
miles from Buna Village on the left to Duropa Plantation on the 
right. The fighting concentrated at two points along the enemy line, 
Urbana front on the extreme left and Warren front on the extreme 
right. Observing Urbana front on 2 December, Eichelberger found 


14 


that the troops were exhausted, starved, feverish, and in tatters. 
Even worse, they had lost spirit, with some beginning to believe 
that the Japanese in their heavily timbered bunkers were unbeat- 
able. Too many troops sat in rear-echelon aid stations on “rest” sta- 
tus. Although the I Corps commander considered the American 
troops still able to mount attacks, he saw much evidence that 
seemed to confirm the rumor he had heard in Port Moresby: that 
the 32d Division was near the breaking point. 

Eichelberger neither hesitated nor let personal feelings stand in his 
way. He immediately relieved General Harding, an old friend from the 
West Point class of 1909, as well as the commanders of both the Ur- 
bana and the Warren fronts. Preparations for the next round of attacks 
then went forward with several reasons for optimism. After more than 
a month of operating under combat conditions, the supply situation 
had improved noticeably. The troops had more food and some time to 
rest, and as a result their morale rose. The combat support situation, 
too, had improved. Eichelberger could expect more bombing sorties 
from Fifth Air Force and more artillery preparation. Best of all, the 
Americans could attack behind a spearhead of five Bren gun carriers, 
tracked vehicles with machine guns that might at last give the infantry 
an effective weapon against the nearly impregnable enemy bunkers. 

The attack began in both the Australian and American sectors on 
5 December. It soon developed into another Allied disaster. Within 
twenty minutes all the Bren gun carriers had been knocked out, and 
attacking infantry stalled all along the line. Now Eichelberger had ex- 
perienced for himself the Japanese tenacity in defense. He ordered 
the troops on the Warren front to maintain positions and conduct 
local patrols, but the Urbana front remained very active. Showing the 
persistence necessary to match that of the Japanese, the 2d Battalion 
of the 126th mounted twelve attacks against enemy bunkers during 
8-11 December, but it could not break through. For the first time, 
however, the Americans had a fresh reserve to draw on. With the re- 
cent arrival of the 127th Infantry, the 32d Division finally had its full 
complement of three infantry regiments. The 3d Battalion of the 
127th now took over on the Urbana front. 

In the Australian sector, the 7th Infantry Division kept up the 
pressure, assisted by Americans from the 126th Infantry who were 
showing commendable tenacity themselves in holding a roadblock 
before Sanananda against repeated Japanese attacks. On 9 Decem- 
ber the 7th built up enough momentum to push through the enemy 
defenses and take Gona Village, the western anchor of the Japanese 
perimeter. The Australians had given the Allies their first major vic- 


15 



Coconut log bunker with fire trench entrance in the Buna Village area. 
(DA photograph) 


tory since Milne Bay in early September. Good news soon followed 
from the Urbana front. On 14 December the U.S. 3d Battalion over- 
ran Buna Village, pushing the remaining enemy into Buna Mission. 

After the failure of the 5 December attack, Eichelberger de- 
cided that to have any chance of success he would have to change 
tactics. Fortunately the supply establishment at Port Moresby sup- 
ported his determination: the tanks Harding had requested in No- 
vember were finally on the way forward. They would spearhead the 
attack over the drier terrain of Warren front. With the new tanks 
came two fresh Australian battalions to reinforce the U.S. 128th In- 
fantry. Australian Brigadier George F. Wootten would command 
the next series of Warren front attacks. 

Anticipating Allied attacks, the Japanese conducted resupply 
missions by sea at night. Despite the best efforts of the Fifth Air 
Force, the enemy managed to put ashore during December about 
1,300 fresh troops with supplies at several points west of Gona. These 
troops then made their way at night to Sanananda and Buna Mission. 

The attack from Warren front began early on 18 December. Fol- 
lowing a ten-minute air and artillery preparation, Wootten sent his 


16 



new combined arms team ahead. The tanks immediately proved 
their worth by allowing infantrymen to get inside the enemy perime- 
ter where, by enveloping successive bunkers, they overcame the op- 
position. The Allies had finally evolved the tactic to defeat Japanese 
bunker complexes. Over the next ten days the Warren force swept 
westward along the coast and reclaimed two airfields. 

On the Urbana front, where the terrain did not support tanks, 
the fighting remained a desperate tree-by-tree, bunker-by-bunker 
struggle. Extremes of heroism were called for, and the troops re- 
sponded. On the day before Christmas, Company 1, 127th Infantry, 
had just cleaned out an enemy bunker only to be pinned down by a 
supporting strongpoint nearby. When 1st Sgt. Elmer J. Burr saw a 
hand grenade land next to his company commander, he immedi- 
ately threw himself on it and absorbed the explosion with his own 


17 


body. For his heroism Sergeant Burr received the first Medal of 
Honor awarded in the campaign. Later the same day Sgt. Kenneth 
E. Gruennert of Company L, 127th Infantry, volunteered to knock 
out two enemy bunkers that were holding up his company’s ad- 
vance. Crawling forward alone, he killed all the enemy in the first 
bunker by throwing grenades through the firing slits. Although 
severely wounded, Gruennert bandaged himself and set out against 
the second bunker. Throwing his grenades with great precision, the 
sergeant routed the enemy from their position. But before he could 
call his comrades forward, he was mortally wounded by snipers. For 
eliminating these two bunkers Sergeant Gruennert received the sec- 
ond Medal of Honor of the campaign. 

By 28 December the Warren force closed with the Urbana force 
and accomplished a complete envelopment of the enemy. In coor- 
dinated attacks from 31 December to 2 January, the two forces met 
and flushed the Japanese from the jungle. As the Japanese swam to- 
ward remaining enemy enclaves to the west, machine guns fired on 
them from the beach, and aircraft came in for strafing runs. 

Now only Sanananda remained in Japanese hands. This lone 
enemy bastion consisted of one prepared position on the coast and 
several pockets of troops who had retreated from Gona and Buna. 
Units participating in the final offensive were now augmented by the 
U.S. 163d Infantry, the first regiment of the 41st Division to see ac- 
tion in the Pacific. Over the next twenty days the Allies overcame 
Japanese resistance with repeated artillery barrages, tank assaults, 
and infantry envelopments. The only slowdown in the Allied ad- 
vance occurred when the enemy knocked out three tanks with spe- 
cial ammunition — ammunition that intelligence officers had re- 
ported as totally expended. The poor state of the enemy contributed 
as much to their defeat as did the Allies’ gradually improving tactics. 
Without resupply for weeks, Japanese troops had only a few car- 
tridges per man, and their rice ration ran out during the second 
week of January. When Allied troops broke through the last enemy 
defense line, they found evidence of cannibalism. Japanese resis- 
tance at Sanananda came to an end on 22 January, six months to the 
day after the Papua Campaign began. 

Analysis 

The United States Army learned much from the Papua Cam- 
paign but at a high cost. Allied losses totaled 8,546 killed and 
wounded. Of those, the 32d Division lost 687 killed in action and 


18 


2,161 wounded or lost from other causes. The lack of leaders expe- 
rienced in jungle fighting accounted in part for these losses. Be- 
cause the campaign was the Army’s first in a world war tropical the- 
ater, everyone involved had to learn while under fire. The last 
combat experience of the Allied leaders had ended in 1918. The 
Australians had spent recent years in the Middle East. Only General 
MacArthur, with years of duty in the Philippines, brought to the 
campaign any familiarity with jungle fighting, but as theater com- 
mander he exercised leadership far from the front. The necessarily 
trial-and-error tactical approach of the Allies in the early stages of 
the campaign inevitably delayed the victory. 

The campaign also made serious training deficiencies obvious. 
The beginning of the campaign revealed that the American troops 
were insufficiently hardened for extended forced marches, poorly 
schooled in the techniques of night patrolling and assaulting fortified 
positions, and unprepared for operations in a tropical environment. 
Too much had to be learned by experimentation, such as how to 
read terrain to avoid swamps or how to identify locations of enemy 
bunkers and fields of fire. In future campaigns American troops 
would have to complete arduous marches like that over the Owen 
Stanley Mountains and still be able to mount assaults or turn back 
enemy counterattacks. Some of the deficiencies in training could be 
laid to the radical changes in deployment plans experienced by the 
32d Division. After its training on the east coast had been inter- 
rupted by orders to board ship for the British Isles, the division was 
turned around and sent cross-country to the west coast to embark for 
the Southwest Pacific. In Australia the division again started a train- 
ing schedule, only to see it too interrupted when the Japanese ad- 
vanced toward Port Moresby. Although SWPA staff officers consid- 
ered the 32d Division not yet ready for combat, they rushed the unit 
to New Guinea. For the 32d Division there had been too much time 
spent in transit and not enough in actual training. 

Combat support in nearly all facets fell short of needs during 
much of the campaign. Military intelligence, the basis of all opera- 
tional planning, failed to provide a true understanding of the enemy 
on New Guinea. In two notable failures, SWPA underestimated the 
Japanese determination to take Port Moresby and, later, the number 
of enemy troops at Buna. These two errors led to the unrealistic ex- 
pectation that the campaign could be completed by 1 December. 
Also, for too long MacArthur believed better leadership could over- 
come any obstacle presented by enemy or terrain. 


19 


Another glaring lack was operational fires to support attacking 
infantry. Ground officers argued long and loud against the prevail- 
ing SWPA attitude on artillery support, an attitude summarized by 
General Kenney when he said, “The artillery in this theater flies.” 
The result of this bias in favor of air power was a chronic shortage of 
on-call artillery fire that made the work of attacking infantry units 
much more difficult. During the failed November attacks, the 32d 
Division on the Warren front had only eight Australian 25-pounders 
and two 3.7-inch mountain howitzers in addition to the 60-mm. and 
81 -mm. mortars normally carried by battalions, and on the Urbana 
front it had only four 25-pounders in addition to the mortars. Only 
one 105-mm. howitzer was used during the entire campaign. 

In the absence of heavier artillery, tanks would have greatly 
aided infantry advances in the early months of the campaign. At- 
tacking troops badly needed a weapon to help them overcome well- 
prepared Japanese defensive positions, and tanks would have been 
the best choice. Despite the swampy terrain, tanks had shown their 
value in the December attacks on the Warren front. At the very 
least, tanks held the promise of reducing, in a matter of minutes, 
enemy positions that could for days hold units armed only with rifles 
and hand grenades. In November General Harding requested tanks 
he knew to be at Milne Bay, but instead he received only the inef- 
fective Bren gun carriers. Not until late in the campaign did SWPA 
send tanks to the battlefronts. 

Air support was also inadequate, and it was often poorly coordi- 
nated with ground units. Not only did aircraft bomb friendly units sev- 
eral times, they also on occasion missed targets entirely. The Fifth Air 
Force also gave a low priority to the protection of supply lines, with 
the result that coastal luggers were run ashore or sunk on several oc- 
casions. At the same time, however, air squadrons performed valuable 
service in delivering fresh troops and supplies over the Owen Stanleys 
to battlefronts and in evacuating the sick and the wounded to Port 
Moresby. Troop airlifts allowed entire regiments to minimize the de- 
bilitating effects of mountainous terrain and tropical climate. 

Naval gunfire and aircraft could have partially compensated for the 
lack of artillery and land-based air support, but the enemy’s presence 
and a support mission in the Solomons reduced the availability of such 
support. Twice Navy ships withdrew from the southwest Pacific area in 
response to the Japanese fleet movements. Both of these withdrawals 
reflected the Navy’s reluctance to expose its carriers and transports to 
enemy air squadrons based at Rabaul. General MacArthur opposed 
the withdrawals because they exposed friendly units ashore to enemy 


20 



Disabled Bren gun carriers at Duropa Plantation. (DA photograph) 


air attack and delayed ship-to-shore movement of troops and sup- 
plies. In search of more reliable air and amphibious support, 
MacArthur decided to organize a new unit for future campaigns: the 
engineer special brigade. These brigades would soon carry troops and 
equipment ashore, organize beaches, and construct airfields. 

The generally unreliable supply situation during the campaign 
seriously damaged troop morale, already threatened by the climate 
of New Guinea. Troops who had to carry most of their supplies on 
their backs, who opened tins of meat only to find it rancid, who 
could not drink the water all around them because they had no pu- 
rification equipment, and who ran out of ammunition soon became 
exhausted, demoralized, hungry, and vulnerable to disease. The 32d 
Division’s experience with illness shows how the climate became an 
adversary itself. Of the 10,825 men in the division, 7,125 became sick 
at some time, an extraordinary rate of 66 percent. 

Airdrops and coastal vessels introduced more supply problems 
than they solved. The best solution was more airfields closer to bat- 
tlefronts. When engineer special brigades became available for fu- 
ture campaigns, aircraft could bring fresh supplies to engaged units 
even if the battle raged only a few hundred yards ahead. Resupply 


21 


pauses after assaults could be much reduced, allowing attacking in- 
fantry to maintain pressure on the enemy. 

The Papua Campaign made clear that U.S. Army units commit- 
ted to combat in the summer of 1942 were insufficiently trained, 
equipped, led, and supported in comparison to an enemy that had 
been fighting for five years. Under the imperative of combat, new 
leaders had emerged, and new battle tactics and support techniques 
had been developed. But the Army would not have long to wait or 
far to go before testing its new leaders, tactics, and techniques. The 
Japanese had been defeated at the eastern end of Papua, but they 
had not abandoned New Guinea. Sizable Japanese forces remained 
at several points west of Buna, and reinforcements and supplies were 
still coming in from Rabaul. The next battle was only days away. 


22 


For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office 

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP USGPO: 1992 302-271 

Washington, DC 20402-9328 

ISBN 0-16-035883-3 


Further Readings 


Readings on the Papua Campaign are generally broad in scope 
but few in number. The views of the top American commanders 
are presented in Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (1964); in 
Robert L. Eichelberger and Milton Mackaye, Our Jungle Road to 
Tokyo (1950); and in the published letters of General Eichelberger: 
Jay Luvaas, ed., Dear Miss Em (1972). A sketch of the top Aus- 
tralian commander during the campaign, General Sir Thomas A. 
Blarney, and of his relations with MacArthur, is to be found in 
William E Leary, ed.. We Shall Return!: MacArthuEs Commanders 
and the Defeat of Japan, 1942-1945 (1988). A popular account, and 
one with personal anecdotes from all ranks, is Lida Mayo, Bloody 
Buna (1974). A concise description of the battle for Buna and pro- 
fessional analysis of its lessons is Jay Luvaas, “Buna, 19 November 
1942-2 January 1943: A ‘Leavenworth Nightmare,’ ” Chapter 7 of 
Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, eds., America’s First Battles, 
1776-1965 (1986). The most exhaustive treatment of the campaign 
remains Samuel Milner, Victory in Papua (1957), a volume in the se- 
ries United States Army in World War II. 


CMH Pub 72-7 


Cover: Troops of the 3d Battalion, 128th Infantry, 32d Infantry Division, cross 
a stream near Boreo, assisted by Papuan volunteers. (DA photograph) 


13 5 94 


PIN : 068915-000 



r 










.11 





■ • '^iv. ;.; : ,«e;, ■ '■^- 


% 


[. • r^ 




'ir 


At. 




•ii'(.,o 'f 





f' 7 *. ’■ (■ •' > >'. dnwBH'.y^w ■' j'* '"‘‘YP*:^ \ 

-■ ■'"■ '* W-V'T' . '■’Vipi;i'« .’'v; " '■•< !, ^»V:‘''^<1K'V 


» i 


■¥ w« 


■'*■/!’'/:,' '■* ' '■;'.i^'''v;;^j'; >''>' ■ 

I. • /' I 1 i ‘ * . I ijiis .^ ■ ♦'ii<.*'vV' r ' T ' ". .i-'T^V 'uj ' (t' ; k 

•L-iAlJLjJ V 'JM/T '1/14.-'. 


M:- ' 'a i 






i ^4 


T' '.■, ' ■ •:i-/../-;V 


\ i f 




•wV-i 

t 


'•^■7 '"'^PW", ^ ■ '• 

“ ■ r^m ^ 

f - 'Witi 

t ., 

'i .4/’ »■;.! ,. ' '*. **' i'. 


K k 



i :i ‘..itAi..'-'/'* 




- 14 ^ 


^71- 


IfpJi 






’ r I iiiMiiii l^ ■ ’ -1. '■ '' V^’^'i'^*' .,. * -iitav 


fj 


I 1 / 


’'fV' 


'l • » '7 7 - 



■ *■ .l ".1 

'■‘.Tj 

>41 (.'’MilV ' 


.# ■' - '^ P'k 
•' ... .'j! ' . * : .>1 ' 


fi 


, Ifi t v|| 



' i 'V;^A!*^ "' ^ 



oi 

i -'.i'v'’i!f,'i'<,‘ ' 

A ■' 



iW 


S. 




V^' f> 


:<r. 






.•'., ... i 4 i l^clr 

V^au/‘ 


i. if 


It, 


!(' .*110 - . Jii 








!* -*^4 

L'.lf .'J> , ’ * 




4‘ 






‘r-^^ 




\m » ft ’ 

. » 




-'.V 74 


I\ 


. Pi 




* -ii- * 


•_ft: 


•w .: ■ ■ r ■-■'.s'w® 


.1.1 


'.# 


t - 


•ir 


'AA 



I. 


?'*•» ■ ‘ 1 ^'r'..'.' •*' 'I'i ' * ' ''*'' 

^ 


\r w 






N /r] 


.r iL 




■\ 1 




.0 \i 


kl« 







fX 


if 


k;- 








\ Iw/ /\ %W/ Im" /' 

■' * ‘ *4<^^** “‘/V’ * ‘* o'?‘*^o''«< \l^ • • ‘1<^*« "'‘/V" • ** O?*^to»< 
'Si : ^»: ■'■"o' ;^&-. *b>' • !»•: ■'"o' 


-’-^^/V .0 -f. 


. o^>*' 

: « 


^ ^ fuSSc 0 ^ V^ ‘'v5i>ri • V/ K e 

t'%t. •%w.'’ v''-o ^ 



■^»** §f :^K* V “^R- V 


LI. 





^ O 


I-* <cr 


feO »0 4 


^OHO“> 


nV fcOHO* 


frOHC* 


OHO*® 


♦sieo^ 


V4 






*^ 0 »| 0 ^ 


L- • 


fcOHO* 


^ a liO'^ 




'•*(/ V'* 


.•*>" V*: 


^DHO^ 


^OlsO^ 


HECKMAN 

BINDERY INC. 

FEB 94 


MANCHESTER, (j 




INDIANA 46962 


ONOa 






